Bill Emmott, The Fate Of The West: The Decline and Revival of the World’s Most Valuable Political Idea (Economist Books)
James Kirchick, The End of Europe: Dictators, Demagogues, and the Coming Dark Age (Yale University Press)
Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford University Press)
Richard Haass, A World In Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (Penguin Press)
For nearly a generation, the West has been experiencing something like progress in reverse. With the fallout from the US-led Iraq War spreading instability from the Middle East to Europe, the 2008 financial crisis undermining voters’ faith in liberal capitalism, and nationalist populism resurgent almost everywhere, anyone pondering the fate of the West in 2017 could be forgiven for seeking some cheer or consolation.
These four new books will not provide it. On the contrary, a cultural historian might one day argue that these offerings, among many others in the publishing pipeline, reflected a morbid state of introspection in the West, sustained by the mounting political and economic challenges of their time.
Bill Emmott, a former editor of the Economist, uses a stream of D-words to describe the West’s current predicament: “demoralized, decadent, deflating, demographically challenged, divided, disintegrating, dysfunctional, declining.” Superficially viewed, Emmott’s book amounts to a seemingly aimless tour of randomly selected countries: one minute we are in Italy or Sweden, and then it’s off to Japan via California. And while Emmott never really explains why Japan is “Western,” China, by contrast, is grouped among the “barbarians at the gates,” along with the Islamic State (ISIS) and Russia. But surely Chinese unilateralism is no match for the “exemptionalism” that has characterized the United States’ approach to international bodies such as the International Criminal Court and the Law of the Sea treaty.
We further learn much about, for example, the social impact of population aging, or how we can live alongside robots, including those that will chat to granny when, aged 90 or so, she is no longer working. His book has many fascinating asides, for example, that professional licensing requirements in many US states mean that “cosmetologists” must spend more hours in school than lawyers.
But to focus on this sort of detail would be to miss the serious message that Emmott seeks to convey. While he does not retreat from a classical defense of “open society” in the manner of Karl Popper or George Soros, he acknowledges that much has gone wrong since the 2008 crisis, and he is rightly scathing about the role played by investment bankers and their confected financial products.
Specifically, Emmott investigates the decline of social trust (albeit without connecting it to immigration from countries where social trust is non-existent) and a worryingly widespread sense of unfairness – including the loss of effective political voice or even access to the law – that is undermining democracy in its heartlands. Emmott shows how privilege is replicated across generations through educational advantages and “assortative mating,” not to mention erosion of access to careers – for example, acting, tabloid journalism, and pop music – that in living memory were open to talented working-class people. How else does one explain the “social dyspepsia” that is turning millions of ordinary voters toward charlatans, fanatics, and hucksters?
There is also a huge gulf between permanent workers with legal protections and job security, and the precari on temporary or zero-hour contracts, whose rights cunning corporate human resources departments limit to the phone call summoning them to a day’s lucky labor. Fear of falling into that trap presumably affects those who have crawled their way up to semi-respectability, but who now find life as random as a game of snakes and ladders.
At the same time, big money is talking louder than ever – whether through direct access to politicians or by deploying well-connected lobbyists – and democratic political systems are being corrupted by vested interests every bit as powerful as the over-mighty British trade unions of the 1970s. Donald Trump’s biggest selling point, as he incessantly reminded everyone, was that he didn’t need others’ money, whereas Hillary Clinton seemed only too eager to accept support from any obnoxious source, whether a Russian oligarch, a Gulf Arab, or a Wall Street fat cat. Likewise, the Dutch populist Geert Wilders ostentatiously refuses the public funding to which political parties in the Netherlands are entitled – though his alleged reliance on anti-Islamist US donors is almost as worrying as the soft loans French National Front leader Marine Le Pen solicits from Kremlin-connected Russian banks.
Le Pen’s rise is but one reason the young American neoconservative journalist James Kirchick is apocalyptic about Europe’s fate. He speaks of a “Europe unmoored from the Enlightenment values it brought to the world, ignorant of and unwilling to protect its civilizational achievements, captive to chauvinist demagogues, indisposed to defend itself, [and] cowed before Russia.” Reversion to a “traditional state of nature, with nations pursuing mercenary self-interest at the expense of unity, would not only spell the end of Europe, as we know it.” Kirchick writes. “Such a collapse would usher in nothing less than a new dark age.”
Judging by Kirchick’s tone, we are already entering that dark age. The elegiac late Roman bishop Sidonius Apollinaris comes to mind, watching barbarian Burgundians smearing rancid butter in their hair. But Kirchick is more interested in mapping the surface of the present, rather than listening for the echoes of deep history.
His book moves smoothly across Europe’s main, current fault lines, north and south, west and east. He notes the worrying increase in conservatives’ enthusiasm for that decisive slayer of Islamist dragons, Russian President Vladimir Putin, without noting that this sentiment has entered US Republican circles as well – and not because of Russian information warfare.
Kirchick’s best chapters are on Greece and Hungary, where he manages a seamless blend of contemporary history, politics, and reporting. The chapter on Greece strikingly exonerates the European Union of any blame for that country’s much-publicized status as the helpless victim of the supposedly all-powerful “Troika” institutions (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). Instead, Kirchick (rightly) blames a long record of extreme political polarization and clientelism in Greece, which Syriza (and their Anel partners) have perpetuated while playing juvenile games with the Troika.
Turning to Hungary, Kirchick is especially enlightening on sinister historical revisionism regarding Admiral Miklos Horthy’s Nazi-era regime. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party has managed to adopt eight of the ten policy planks of the neo-fascist Jobbik party’s platform, while still belonging to the main European People’s Party bloc of centrist conservative parties in the EU parliament.
Kirchick’s least successful chapters are those on France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. The French chapter is warmed-over Bat Y’eor-style alarmism about Islamists establishing “Eurabia” in plain sight and precipitating an exodus of Europe’s largest Jewish population. As with other ideological writers, we learn far less about the cooler stuff of constitutional and electoral mechanisms. There is nothing here about how the electoral system frustrates the National Front, particularly elections to the National Assembly, so that even were Le Pen to become president in May, a paralyzing bout of “cohabitation” would most likely ensue.
It seems oddly disproportionate to devote most of the chapter on Germany to defending the US National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency from charges of spying on German politicians, until one realizes that Kirchick worked for Radio Free Europe. It is as if understanding Europe’s largest country and most successful economy depended on refuting Der Spiegel’s predictably lurid enthusiasm for the issue. He also falls into the trap of treating Germany’s leaders as if they were so much benignly inert pudding, rather than powerful people coldly calculating the merged interests of their country and Europe.
The chapter on Britain is really an extended attack on current Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn – evidently the Man Who Would Be Hugo Chávez – and the anti-Semitism in Labour’s ranks. Kirchick, whose contacts and range of reference seem very limited, might have benefited from reading more astringent critics of British society like George Walden. Brexit enthusiasts will not like this American view of a country going over a cliff – or, rather, straight to China, in Kirchick’s account – especially as so many Americans seem to regard Brexit as their St. John the Baptist moment before Trump.
A “golden age” with China – endorsed by both former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne and Prime Minister Theresa May – seems to worry Kirchick. “London is straying from its once firmly Atlanticist, Western orientation and careening toward a heretofore unexplored and unpredictable strategic gray zone,” he writes, offering little substantive evidence.
Kirchick’s book obviously appeared too late to consider how Trump may derange the world, or how his diffuse provocations might incline many in Europe toward a China that, despite its authoritarianism, endorses free markets and international institutions. But nor does Kirchick bring fresh insight to pre-Trump Europe. The chapter on Ukraine adds little to standard accounts; it does not explore, for example, popular Dutch rejection of the EU’s gambits with Kyiv, which surely reflected the widespread feeling in core Benelux members of being marginalized by the Union’s indefinite eastward expansion. Indeed, though Kirchick grinds many axes, his perception of what ails Europe is dulled by the lack of any systematic analysis of EU policymaking.
Given Kirchick’s kneejerk glibness, one turns with something like relief to Michael Mandelbaum’s closely argued, lively, and deeply researched monograph on US foreign policy following the end of the Cold War. Mandelbaum, the author of such classics as The Frugal Superpower, is the expert’s expert on foreign affairs, with a steady eye for the process of policymaking.
This book is hard to pigeonhole politically – and is all the better for it. Mandelbaum addresses the missed opportunities that accompanied the Cold War’s end in 1989-1991. Most notable was the chance to craft a new European security architecture with Russia, though some might object that not enlarging NATO was never a serious option, given the influence of Polish-American voters and political leaders.
With superpower confrontation in abeyance, US force was put to new purposes. Mandelbaum examines the overseas interventions of the 1990s – in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the decade-long air interdiction of northern and southern Iraq by successive administrations. NATO, it was decided, was too big a sledgehammer to crack drug traffickers and the like. Militaries were to be reconfigured as armed social workers. In the event, as counterinsurgency warfare became the default tactical paradigm, they would become self-styled armed anthropologists, too.
Eventually, under President George W. Bush, this messianic stream completely overran US foreign policy. The assumption was that everyone wanted to be like Americans, a tenable conceit so long as small countries lacked a great power to protect them. But in an age when elites and voters alike are easily distracted, nation- and state-building (they are not identical) were beyond American capacities – one of the few themes Mandelbaum does not explore. It might have been useful, too, to address how foreign countries big and small, employing armies of lobbyists in Washington, attempt to capture Americans’ attention and shape their perceptions of the world.
Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, arrogant fools (mostly neocons, but more than a few liberals as well) would rush into Afghanistan and then Iraq to remodel societies of which they were largely ignorant. And the US was just getting warmed up for wars of transformation in another half-dozen countries. Mandelbaum’s account is all the more damning because of his scrupulous fairness to those involved, though, apropos of Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn Rule (“You break it, you bought it”), he acidly observes that “the prospect of owning Iraq apparently did not faze President George W Bush.”
Mandelbaum is surely right about the long-term consequences of these wars of choice. In the course of a grueling decade of war, the US was first too distracted and then too exhausted to sustain a benign international order. And now the long term has arrived, with the malign breakdown of that order. We have reached a new point, it is safe to say, when China’s president, speaking at Davos, sounds more like a US president than the actual US president who, in his Inaugural Address, made Milwaukee sound like Mogadishu. By the time Trump has finished, Mandelbaum will have much more to ponder, as will we all, and he will be just the right person to sort out the ideological and practical forces that powered Trump’s foreign policy.
Richard Haass’s timely and lucid intervention suggests the scope of what we will be pondering. Haass, a senior adviser on the Middle East to George H.W. Bush, was also a distinguished envoy to Northern Ireland under Bush Junior, reminding Sinn Fein/IRA at a critical juncture (while stuck in the country after 9/11) that the US had run out of sympathy for terrorists.
Haass has been an excellent president of the Council on Foreign Relations, too. His previous book Foreign Policy Begins at Home might have served as the new administration’s vade mecum, had Trump picked Haass for Secretary of State (as some had vainly hoped). As it is, a condensed version appears here as Chapter 12.
The first half of the new book, which originated as a trio of lectures given at Cambridge University, deals with the familiar history of world orders, usually established after catastrophic wars: 1648, 1815, 1918 (perhaps wisely neglected by Haass), and 1945. An international order, Haass shows, is something between formal institutions and rules of the game that the major players more or less accept. By way of example, he gives clear and concise accounts of the post-1945 evolution of nuclear non-proliferation and the World Trade Organization.
Viewed in these terms, the more recent “Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P, so beloved of crusading human-rights lawyers, must be deemed a failure. For one thing, China, Russia, and many other countries have come to regard R2P as synonymous with a Western right to intervene; for another, it could be reverse engineered by, say, Putin, to justify “protecting” the Russophone minority in Ukraine.
The “unipolar moment” of US hegemony after 1989-1991 proved evanescent and ultimately illusory. It collapsed after US neoconservatives, seeking to lock in American supremacy, returned the world to pre-Westphalian anarchy by violently intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign states – though President Barack Obama’s support for Anglo-French regime change masquerading as humanitarian intervention in Libya was of a piece.
This is all a preamble to what Haass calls a “world in disarray,” a slightly consoling choice of words, if only because he eschewed stronger stuff like “anarchy” and “chaos.’” Then again, “disarray” is potent enough, reflecting as it does a widely shared concern about an undefined, transitional era, in which an already large number of regional crises and transnational threats are likely to be overlain by revived great power competition and conflict.
The more prescriptive parts of Haass’s book are less successful, in my view, because I find it difficult to fathom what Haass means by the concept of “sovereign obligation,” the key to what he calls World Order 2.0. While he is certainly right to say that the US will remain the world’s most powerful country for decades to come, I think he may be wrong about the role of others in shaping the new order.
Sadly, A World in Disarray appears too late to take Trump into account. But perhaps Haass has offered a veiled warning. “There is much to be said for a foreign policy equivalent of stare decisis,” he writes, because “wholesale, frequent reversals run the risk of unnerving friends and emboldening adversaries. Disarray at home is thus inextricably linked to disarray in the world. The two together are nothing short of toxic.”
As I read that, Trump was rejecting the need for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict – a staple of US foreign policy for the past quarter-century. A few days later, he claimed to “like the two-state solution.” Likewise, having welcomed the prospect of the EU imploding (and forcing European Council President Donald Tusk to convene an emergency summit a fortnight later), Trump soon switched course: “I’m totally in favor of [the EU]. I think it’s wonderful, if they’re happy. If they’re happy – I’m in favor of it.”
One can almost see American soft power – a subject Haass ignores – evaporating. Trump’s threats, policy reversals, “alternative facts,” and capricious, often peevish behavior have provided abundant fodder for social media. But, in the real world, the US will be unable to bolster global order if it continues to lose followers.
Michael Burleigh’s books include Small Wars, Faraway Places: The Genesis of the Modern World, Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism, and The Third Reich: A New History, and The Best and the Worst of Times: The World As It Is (forthcoming in early November from Pan Macmillan). He is CEO of the global political risk consultancy Sea Change Partners.